BUCHER, Sir (Francis Robert) Roy (1895-1980), General K.B.E. CB. MC

 

Service biography:

 

World War I 1914-1918;

1 Bn Cameronians, France 1914-1915;  55 Cokes Rifles, India 1915;  31 Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers 1916;  Mahsud 1917;  Afghanistan and Waziristan 1919-1920;  Staff College, Camberley 1926-1927;  Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Deccan District, India 1930-1932;  13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers 1937.

 

World War II 1939-1945;

Commandant, Sam Browne's Cavalry 1939-1940;  Commandant, ACTC, Lucknow 1940;  Assistant Adjutant General, General Headquarters 1941;  Assistant Quartermaster General, Iraq 1941;  in charge of Administration, Southern Command, India 1942-1945;

 

 

 General Officer Commanding Bengal and Assam Area, India 1946;  General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command, India 1946-1947;  Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters, India 1947;  Commander-in-Chief and Chief of General Staff, Army of India 1948-1949;  Indian Ministry of Defence Officer on special duty, retired 1949.

 

Filed papers of AF Louis (Francis Albert Victor Nicholas) Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma, include correspondence with General Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher relating to Hyderabad, India 1948.

 

The Indo-Pak war of 1947- 48 was unique in modem military history because it is the only war fought by two modem armies, which were both commanded by British generals.  The commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of the Indian army was the General, Sir Roy Bucher, and his Pakistani counterpart was General Douglas Gracey.  All three services in India and Pakistan were commanded by British officers.

 

But by 1948, Nehru had come around to the conclusion that this was not an immediately feasible proposition.  The C-in-C, General Bucher, advised him that militarily it was not possible to establish control over the entire territory of Jammu & Kashmir, with the British also supporting Pakistan.  Pakistan suspected the Maharaja wanted to accede to India and tried to pre-empt his decision by forcibly seizing the state.

 

A cabinet meeting was organised for September 12th to take a final decision. Among those who attended were Prime Minister Nehru, Home Minister Patel, Defence Minister Baldev Singh, Gopalswamy Iyengar, General Bucher, Lt. Gen. (later Field Marshal and C-in-C, IA) K M Cariappa and Air Marshal Sir Thomas W. Elmhirst (C-in-C, IAF).

As the decision was being finalised, Gen. Bucher stood up and said, "Gentlemen, you have taken a decision in a difficult matter.  I must give you my warning. We are also committed in Kashmir.  We cannot say how long it will take so we will end up having two operations on our hands.  This is not advisable, so as your C-in-C I ask you not to start the operations."  He further offered his resignation if his advice was not heeded.

There was a silence while a distressed and worried Nehru looked around.  Patel replied, "You may resign General Bucher, but the police action will start tomorrow."  A angry General Bucher stormed out, and coincidentally the next few days saw a rise in the Kashmir operations.

General Sir Roy Bucher (the out going C-in-C) and Lady Bucher at Government House, New Delhi, when they lunched with his Excellency, Shri. C. Rajagopalachari, and the new Commander-in-Chief, General K. M. Cariappa.

 

India's own first C-in-C in January 1949 was General Cariappa.  One of the things that greatly concerned the British at the closing stage of this war was that General Cariappa was taking initiatives that General Sir Roy Bucher could not control.  The British did not want an Indo-Pak war.  They were conscious that hostilities would break out and had issued secret orders to all British officers 'to stand down' in the event of a war.  These officers were told they could resign their commission or function in an advisory capacity.  The British clearly did not want the whole of Jammu & Kashmir to go to India.  There was a widespread feeling in London that if India was in control of areas contiguous to Pakistan, the latter would not survive.

The top-secret cables exchanged between the British missions in India and Pakistan, and Whitehall, tells the true story.  The C-in-C was receiving instructions from the British High Commission in New Delhi.  Nehru had decided to strike at the bases of the raiders in Pakistan but Mountbatten opposed this.

 

The confrontation with Pakistan in the 1965 war.  A book by Kabul had little to say about Choudhuri and Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw's conduct during the 1965 war, he refers to them in the context of the 1948 Kashmir war, when General Sir Roy Bucher was the commander-in-chief; Choudhuri his DMO and Manekshaw the latter's staff officer.  Kaul refers to them as Bucher's men and "both served their master well in key appointments at army headquarters, running the Kashmir war between them.  Bucher was Manekshaw's guest in the chief of army staff's house in Delhi for quite sometime (with government permission) early in 1970.

 

 

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